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Preface 
Conflicts of National Security Interests in 
East Asia and the Pacific: 
At the Turn of the Twenty-First Century 
We in the East Asian Area Studies division of the Department of 
National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, 
California (NPS) are constantly challenged to put on record the results of our 
research on conflicts of national interests in the vast region of East Asia and 
the Pacific (EA/P). 
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Our faculty consists of experienced academicians or government 
servants and our student body is made up of active duty, mid-level officers of 
the navy, marines, army, air force or civilian agencies beginning the 
transition from successful careers in their particular communities to the 
broader world of political-military relations. On the average they have spent 
eight to ten years in the service of their country. Upon completion of their 
Master's degree, they will hopefully be assigned to stations where their 
knowledge can be put into practice. Officers from friendly countries 
frequently participate in our program, but our primary concerns are the 
security interests, objectives and strategies of the United States. 
Our curriculum includes such core courses as international politics, 
international economics, national strategy and American foreign policy as 
well as the standard courses in area studies devoted to the history, culture, 
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laws and institutions of the nation-states located in each of the major regions of 
the world. The capstone of the curriculum is a seminar in which the student-
officers, combining their experience and education, research a topic of 
relevance to the national interest. The subject matter of their theses constitutes 
the heart of this volume. 
Upon my retirement from Stanford and San Jose State, in 1976 I joined the 
faculty at NPS. While continuing my connection with the Hoover Institution at 
Stanford, in 1985 I edited a conference report entitled National Security 
Interests in the Pacific Basin. Such specific problems were addressed as the 
effects on the Pacific Basin as the global confrontation between the 
superpowers, the stresses and strains between the two alliance systems, the 
conflicting demands of security and development in the less developed 
countries, the relationships between foreign policy and domestic politics, the 
escalating costs of national defense, and efforts to preserve stability and create 
conditions for progress in east Asia and the Western Pacific. The conference 
was structured to probe the two main sources of insecurity in the Pacific Basin 
-- those spillovers from superpower confrontation elsewhere on the globe and 
those rooted in local and regional conflicts. 
In the aftermath of Tienanmen and the breaching of the Berlin wall in 
1989, it was evident that the basic assumptions of the Cold War in Europe and 
Asia would have to be reexamined. The findings of the conference in 1985 were 
anachronistic. Each passing year brought significant changes in the 
development of American security policies and in the strategic environment of 
East Asia and the Pacific. Our basic research program at NPS was therefore 
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refashioned to focus on the new but ever-changing situation. The time is 
now opportune to offer this integration of our individual studies. 
This book is designed primarily for all who are concerned with 
conflicts of security interests in the EA/P region but especially for the 100,000 
men and women on active duty who may have been away from 
Asia for some time or who are assigned to the region for the first time. It is 
intended to be a link between students of policy and those actively engaged in 
its implementation. 
In our research, we have profited from the advice and guidance of 
Admiral Thomas Mercer, the Superintendent of NPS and Captain Gregory A. 
Bushnell, his Chief Executive Officer. We have derived immense benefit 
from the publications of our sister institutions -- the National Defense 
University and the respective War Colleges of the Army, Navy and the Air 
Force. Likewise, we owe a debt of gratitude to our colleagues in the 
Department of National Security Affairs for their unfailing cooperation. We 
want also to express our special thanks to diplomats and political-military 
officials -- all the way from Washington to Honolulu to Tokyo, Yokosuka, 
Seoul, Beijing, Manila, Jakarta, Singapore, Sembawan, Vientiane, Phnom 
Penh, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City -- who have been most generous with 
their time and counsel. 
~ntirely aware of our limitations, we shall feel amply rewarded if even 
some of our personnel on active duty find our study useful and if succeeding 
generations of students will keep it up to date. In the course of our research 
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and discussions at NPS, no use was ever made in any way of classified 
material. We have relied entirely on open sources. We express ourselves 
entirely as private citizens, without any responsibility whatever for any of our 
thoughts or statements to be attributed to any person or office in government. 
Monterey, California 
June, 1995 
CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN 
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: 
AT THE TURN OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Introduction. 
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With Korea, Vietnam and the Gull War as bloody memories of the 
past, East Asia and the Pacific enters a new era of international relations with 
the turn to the 21st Century. The entire region, and the rest of the world, 
breathes more freely because the cold war in its passing has taken with it the 
imminent danger of a nuclear holocaust. Never has the time been more 
propitious for a reexamination of conflicts of national security interests in 
East Asia, with special attention to the role of the United States. It is the 
purpose of this study to analyze successively the strategic situation in 
Northeast Asia, China, Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific with a view 
to finding more effective policies and strategies for peace, stability and 
prosperity. 
Geography. History and Growing Importance of the Region. 
The starting point for any study such as this must be the basic facts of 
geography, historical experience, and the growing importance of the region. It 
is far more complex than Europe. The land mass of continental East Asia 
includes the eastern portion of the Russian Federation, China, and the 
nation-states of Southeast Asia. The off-shore island states of Japan, Taiwan, 
the Philippines and Indonesia are integral parts of East Asia. The Russian Far 
East -- as distinct from Siberia and Central Asia -- is the thinly-populated part 
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of Russia east of Lake Baikal. It extends 3000 miles north from Vladivostok to 
the Bering Straits and 2000 miles west from Vladivostok to Irkutsk. 
Vladivostok is more than 8000 miles distant from Moscow or St. Petersburg, 
the heart of Russia. In size, China must be regarded as a continent, roughly 
comparable to the United States. In Southeast Asia, Thailand for example, is 
larger than any European state except Russia. The east to west length of 
Indonesia is comparable to the distance from San Francisco to the Bahamas. 
The Pacific extends from the Aleutians and the Kuriles in the north to 
Australia and New Zealand in the south. From east to west it reaches from 
Acapulco, Los Angeles and Vancouver through the South China Sea to the 
tip of Sumatra and the coast of Burma. From San Francisco to Singapore is 
twice the distance from New York to Moscow. The Pacific is twice the size of 
the Atlantic. Covering over 63 million square miles, it is the world's busiest 
commercial highway. Its fish are the staple food of a billion people and the 
search for oil beneath its surface may be the most dangerous source of 
tomorrow's international rivalry. 
In calculating the effects of geography on national security, diversity is 
at least as important as size as a complicating factor. The nation-states of East 
Asia and the Pacific vary in power and prestige all the way from the tiny 
island states of the mid-Pacific to the larger states topped by Russia, China and 
Japan. Some states have been around for a long time, others have only 
recently emerged. Some are rich in resources, others are poor. Some have 
produced world leaders, others are practically unknown. Although political 
influence in international relations flows from military or economic power, 
every state large or small, is bound to insist upon absolute sovereignty or 
equality before the law in the conduct of its diplomacy. 
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The diversity in the social make-up of each nation constitutes the 
greatest challenge to future security in East Asia and the Pacific. The region is 
home to more than 2 billion people, varying greatly in life styles, culture and 
levels of achievement. Differences in ethnic and religious roots, gaps in the 
standard of living and antagonisms in social and political loyalties have torn 
nations apart for centuries. These truths will become more evident as the 
political microscope passes from country to country. 
The innate cultural differences separating individuals or social groups 
have been aggravated by their historical experience. In the Russian Far East, 
people are grievously divided not only by the scars of Russian imperialism 
but also by the lingering effects of Stalinism and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. China is incredibly complex. Although 90 percent of its people (the 
Han Chinese) are bound together by a common language and a common 
cultural heritage, the other 10 percent (primarily in the border areas) differ 
substantially in ethnic and religious roots. A wide economic gap separates the 
residents of the eastern seacoast from those of the interior provinces. The 
term "revolution" conjures up vastly different images in Beijing and Taiwan, 
and who knows what struggles will follow in mainland China after Deng 
Xiaoping. The approach to security problems on the part of all Chinese, 
however, is irrevocably conditioned by their historical grievances against the 
outside world. 
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The states of Southeast Asia are all enmeshed in territorial or religious 
quarrels. Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia are Muslim; Singapore is Chinese; 
the Philippines is Christian; while Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia and Vietnam are Buddhist. Southeast Asians speak a Babel of 
tongues, with more than 70 dialects identified in the Philippines alone. All 
the Southeast Asian states except Thailand are recent creations and they share 
a common resentment against the indignities of their colonial heritage. They 
now act on the promise that politics stop at the water's edge. Only the 
government in power (not some minority or pretender) has the right to make 
official pronouncements on policy. No outsider, no matter how strong or 
influential, has any right to mess in the internal politics. No Southeast Asian 
state will ever again accept a second class status. 
Now, approaching the twenty-first century, no one in the United States 
or elsewhere would need to be reminded of the great and growing importance 
of East Asia and the Pacific in resolving global issues of war and peace. It is 
not necessary to create an image of a "Pacific Century" as though the region 
were going to be the strategic center of tomorrow's world. It is essential, 
however, to recognize that national interests in East Asia and the Pacific are 
just as vital as those in Europe or Latin America. Since security problems in 
Asia merit their own priority, they can no longer be tackled on the basis of 
Europe First or Latin America first. 
Beyond Containment 
As long as the cold war persisted, it was perceived as a global 
confrontation between the "Communists" and the "Free World". Neither 
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side was too precise about the nature of its adversary. The struggle was at 
once geopolitical, ideological and political. From a geopolitical point of view, 
it was between a group of like-minded, heavily armed group of nation states 
and an equally strong aggregation of powers headed by the United States. 
Ideologically, it was socialism versus the free market and material incentives. 
In its political aspect, the heart of the confrontation was assumed to be 
tyranny or totalitarianism in opposition to the democratic way of life. No one 
in the Free World needed to know anything about the enemy beyond the 
label of "communism". The single requirement for national security was the 
containment of "communism". 
The cold war in Asia lacked the precise perameters of the cold war in 
Europe. In Europe the combined forces of NATO stood eyeball to eyeball 
against the armies of the Warsaw Pact. It was easy to locate the Iron Curtain. 
In Asia it was entirely different. There were no united forces of the Free 
World. Military defense was left to the Americans with only such support as 
their allies were willing to give. There was no NATO -- only a collection of 
bilateral treaties between the United States and each individual ally. There 
was no common ideology or no common style of governance. Whenever the 
United Nations became involved in Asian conflicts -- as in Korea -- it was 
usually in response to American manipulation. 
The communist side in Asia was nearly as fragmented as its opponents. 
China was the wild card. At times China was in step with Soviet Union, at 
other times China treated its Soviet ally with scorn and derision. The two 
communist powers did not act in unison in either Korea or Vietnam, and 
they were constant rivals for leadership of the Third World. Their alliance 
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came to an end in 1981. In ideology, each marched to its own tune. Neither 
Stalin nor Khrushchev ever liked Mao Zedong, nor did Gorbachev or Yeltsin 
have any personal interest in Deng Xiaoping. No one could call "socialism" 
or "communism" of China, Vietnam or North Korea a common ideology. 
The juche of Kim Ilsung bore no resemblance to Deng Xiaoping's "socialism 
with Chinese characteristics". The ideological factor was at best a minor cause 
of cooperation or conflict in Asia. Each communist state created a Leninist 
type of government but it was rooted in indigenous soil. Nationalism was far 
too strong to think of the communist world as monolithic. 
Some states in Asia -- India, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Kampuchea --
chose to be uncommitted in the cold war. They would not cast their lot 
unreservedly with either side. They were not neutral in thought nor 
cowardly in action. They simply chose to be independent and they joined 
with the uncommitted of Africa and Latin America in a global Non-Aligned 
Movement. 
In the time of the cold war, the superpowers managed to avoid the 
ultimate nuclear confrontation. They indulged in an expensive arms race 
and kept the world in a constant fear of impending doom. The Soviets, on 
their side, based their policies on a combination of military power, bluster, 
and diplomatic skill. In Asia, they ruled their Far East with an iron hand and 
maintained alliances with Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam. They kept 
substantial forces along the Chinese border (more than fifty divisions) and 
installed long range missiles capable of delivering nuclear war heads upon 
the United States. They claimed their army was ready to challenge the 
Americans for the control of the North Pacific. 
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The Americans, on their side, depended upon a strong military 
establishment, forward deployment of forces, overseas bases, a supportive 
economy and the cooperation of valued allies. All measures for security were 
subordinated to the military and political requirements of deterrence or 
survival should preventive measures fail. The Americans pursued 
successive defense strategies variously labeled massive retaliation, flexible 
response, mutually assured destruction and reasonable deterrence. Basically, 
the uneasy peace of the cold war in Asia was preserved by the balance of 
terror, that is, by mutual appreciation of the horrible consequences of all-out 
war. 
It took three wars -- Korea, Vietnam and Gulf -- to move beyond 
containment. More conflicts of interest than ever were brought to light in 
Asia, but the evidence was convincing that it would take more than military 
methods to solve them. Korea ended in stalemate, Vietnam resulted only in 
frustration, and the Gulf proved that military victory was not sufficient to 
solve the issues that led to fighting in the first place. 
While the superpowers were locked in battle, they could not give 
adequate attention to the great revolutions that were at the same time giving 
rise to an entirely new way of life. The revolutions in science and technology, 
in transportation and communication, and in information affected the 
relationship between the powers, forced a reassessment of the relative value 
of military and economic factors and gave a new meaning to security. 
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By the time the cold war ended, it was no longer a bipolar world. the 
issues of war and peace would no longer be settled by the superpowers. The 
strength of the Soviet Union had evaporated. The Warsaw Pact was 
dissolved and all of Eastern Europe was engulfed in reform. Communism as 
an economic theory was thoroughly discredited. The Russian Federation 
became the successor to the Soviet Union. The territorial integrity of Russia 
in Asia was by no means assured. Russia's national economy was in ruins 
and its political future in doubt. Its nuclear capability was intact but much of 
its arsenal was for sale. Its Pacific fleet was rusting away and much of its army 
was demobilized, dispirited, unemployed and homeless. 
The balance of power in Asia had taken monumental twists and turns. 
Japan, though weak militarily, became an economic giant. Rising from the 
ashes of World War II, and practically without material resources, it took 
advantage of the skills and energies of its hardworking people to construct 
Asia's strongest economy. Being spared of the costs of its own defense due to 
the American alliance, it became a leader in all three of the basic revolutions. 
Japanese multinationals, particularly in automobiles and electronics, became 
prominent in every corner of the globe. 
Japan was followed closely and quickly in these new economic 
directions by the four tigers -- the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China 
(Taiwan), Hong Kong and Singapore. Their future was to be guilt upon 
economics, not primarily upon their armed forces. As if by magic, Indonesia 
and Thailand came to be included in the Newly Industrialized Economies. 
These nation-states of Asia registered the fastest growing GNPs in the world. 
Then China, after the Tienanmen incident, rose to the top among Asia's 
economic powers. Almost immediately it expanded its military capability to 
keep pace with its economic growth. All of the major powers in Asia found 
their voices in world affairs and demanded that they be heard. 
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The ups and downs of the cold war produced the greatest change in the 
role of the United States as the sole surviving superpower in the East Asia 
Pacific region. From military, economic and political standpoints, the United 
States still stood tall above the others but it no longer enjoyed the dominance 
it once possessed. Although its military supremacy was beyond dispute, the 
limitations on that military power could not be overlooked. The Korean 
"police action" led only to stalemate, and the Vietnam "hostilities" ended in 
frustration. The lightning victory in the Gulf War did not drive Saddam 
Hussein out of office while conflicts in other parts of the world -- Bosnia, 
Somalia, Haiti -- only demonstrated the truism that non-military issues 
cannot be solved by military methods. Without the threat of the Soviet 
enemy, the need for overwhelming military supremacy was sharply reduced. 
Because of budgetary stringency, the Americans were obliged to 
downsize their forces and to withdraw from some of their overseas bases. 
When the navy pulled out of Subic Bay, it was painful for the Americans. It 
prompted many Asians to ask whether the Americans might not reasonably 
decide to cut back their Asian commitments. Because it was no longer the 
rich man's paradise as portrayed by Hollywood, the United States might be 
tempted to reduce its assistance programs and pay more attention to collective 
security, arms control and burden sharing. 
Whatever the causes for economic difficulties and social 
maladjustments at home, it was clear at the end of the cold war that 
Americans suffered from increasing evidences of unemployment, poverty 
and crime. The steady decline in the American share of global economic 
activity resulted in ever-mounting budgetary deficits and negative trade 
balances. The United States was transformed from the world's greatest 
creditor nation to the world's greatest debtor nation. 
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Although it was clear that the Soviets were losers in the cold war, it 
was less evident that the Americans were winners. The cold war was not a 
zero sum game. The Americans too were losers. The costs of defense borne 
by the Americans contributed to the wounding of the American psyche. 
Many Asians felt that Americans lost a great deal of their claim to moral 
authority. American society had deteriorated to the extent that the image in 
Asia of the American way of life was seriously damaged. What Asians saw of 
the wars on their TVs was not pleasant watching. The daily viewing of CNN 
or the network news showed more than they cared to know about racism, 
drugs and violence on the streets. They were inclined to think that 
Americans had become too preachy without any justification for being so. 
The passing of the cold war caused the Americans to raise new 
questions about the efficacy of their political relationship with former allies, 
friends and enemies. Why distinguish "friends and enemies" and why not 
seek friendly relations with all states? The old distinctions based on 
communism or democracy were no longer relevant. Today's "friends" can 
conceivably become tomorrow's "enemies" and today's enemies -- as well as 
the non-aligned -- can be included tomorrow in the category of friends. 
Rather than label anyone as "friend" or "enemy", it seemed far better to 
promote peace and prosperity for all. 
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As the United States plans its national security at the turn of the 
Century, the possibility of a Pax Americana is out of the question, primarily 
because the American people themselves have neither the desire nor the 
pocketbook to bring it about. a policy of disengagement is also impossible. 
Every administration, Republican or Democrat, reaffirms that the United 
States is a Pacific power and is in Asia to stay. With its military and economic 
power, it cannot escape the responsibilities of leadership for stability and 
prosperity on the other side of the Pacific. By no means impartial in its 
diplomacy, the United States is the most trusted, or the least hated, of the 
major powers. It is looked upon as keeping some Asians from cutting other 
Asians' throats or as providing a sense of safety and security without 
superiority. Its navy is not suspected as a cover for imperialistic ambitions 
but is welcomed as a distant balancer of power. Asians do not worry that the 
United States will go too far in Asia; they worry that the Americans might 
pack up and go home. 
It may be that the time has come to make and agonizing reappraisal (as 
John Foster Dulles phrased it) of the costs and benefits of each Treaty of 
Mutual Defense of Mutual Cooperation that the United States has concluded 
with each ally. The existing agreements are not ordinary treaties of alliance 
based on reciprocal obligations. They are one-sided commitments on the part 
of the United States to come to the defense of a nation threatened by 
communist aggression. There is no reciprocal commitment on the part of the 
American "ally". 
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The American treaties do not constitute a defense system with 
common institutions and integrated forces. There is no way the allies --
Australia and New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea, Thailand and 
Philippines -- could be welded together into a coherent system. Their 
interests are too diverse, their cultural gaps too wide. The only interest they 
have in common is the central role of the United States in their defense 
against external attack. The Americans have provided the protective shield 
while they have concentrated on economic development. For the 
Americans, it may be that a return to the old system of Treaties of Navigation, 
Amity and Commerce with everybody would be preferable to what some 
perceive as permanent or entangling alliances. 
Some of the allies of the United States, on their own part, might also be 
ready for a change. They never did share completely the American perception 
of the communist threat and they chafed under their patron-client 
relationship. As they watched the world move beyond the cold war, they 
pondered the possibility of a more self-reliant role for themselves. As they 
grew in power and stature, they discounted the value of being hitched to the 
American star in their quest for national security. 
Re-thinking Security 
This is not a new world in which the current quest for security is being 
conducted but an old world which has reemerged from the shell in which for 
four decades it has been encased. East Asia may have been relieved from the 
danger of a nuclear clash but it bristles with local conflicts rooted in suspicion 
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and distrust. In this time of apparent tranquillity, every nation-state is given 
a new opportunity to reappraise its interests, re-assess its threats and devise 
new and appropriate strategies to achieve its objectives. No nation can do as 
it pleases. Every right and privilege it claims for itself, must be limited by the 
corresponding rights and privileges as claimed by its adversaries. 
No nation ever feels safe from all possible threats. None ever thinks it 
has enough security. Each is the sole judge of its needs and expects its 
adversaries to look out for themselves. What one nation sees as self-defense, 
its foes interpret as aggression. In the absence of a rule of law, or accepted 
standards of right and wrong, it has usually been the strongest who gets his 
way. 
The nations of Asia have their own value system and their own 
strategic culture which they want to protect. Whereas we in the West talk 
about freedom, democracy, the free market and the bill of rights, Asians list 
loyalty to the family, respect for authority and welfare of the group as taking 
precedence over the rights of the individual. Any fruitful discussion of 
security issues must take due account of these differences in points of view. 
The perception of 11national security11 is subject to continuous 
modification. Once it was interpreted primarily in political and military 
terms, but the experience of the cold war years has brought to the fore the 
importance of socio-economic factors. The survival of nations and their way 
of life is endangered far more by economic issues and social maladjustment 
than by the threat of military aggression. 
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The political military component of national security must not be 
neglected or underestimated. A "loaded gun counts for more than a fat 
purse". Some states are still in the hands of what US Secretary of Defense 
William Perry refers to as "rouge" governments. Unreconstructed 
Communists in positions of authority, retain their faith in their dogma. For 
the low estate to which they have fallen, they blame human frailty or faulty 
execution of orders. No one on either side of the Pacific can feel absolutely 
secure as long as enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons and long range 
missiles are in existence and human hands are on the button. 
On the other hand, lasting security demands more than a mighty 
military establishment. The more a nation arms, the more it inspires 
potential foes to respond in kind. The result so far has been a standoff 
between potential for overkill and national bankruptcy. Furthermore, the 
causes of insecurity have increasingly been shown to be intractable to military 
measures. 
The socio-economic factors in national security came to the forefront in 
Asia during the cold war years. The United States shouldered most of the 
bills for common defense while the Asian nations concentrated on economic 
development. Japan, the four tigers, the Newly Developed Economies and 
eventually China became serious economic rivals of the United States. As 
others prospered, the United States sank deeper in debt. It was only natural 
that the United States should demand more burden sharing for the costs of 
defense and seek a more level playing field for its international trade. Serious 
arguments followed as old friends in military relations became rivals in 
economics. 
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Economically, the whole region sprang to life. Ideological quarrels 
were put on the back burner as communists and non-communists plunged 
into the competition for profits. It became abundantly clear that communism 
as a way of life was no match for democracy and free enterprise on the path to 
prosperity. The North-South debate between the Third World and the 
"advanced countries" intensified as the gap between them widened. The 
more progressive of the LDCs (Less Developed Countries) with their new 
designation as NIEs (Newly Industrialized Economies) encountered growing 
difficulties in relations with their overseas trading partners and in their 
regional rivalries. The economic arguments between the advanced countries 
overshadowed political differences as they struggled to maximize their 
advantages in the modern version of the classical competition for overseas 
markets and sources of raw materials. As the socio-economic revolutions in 
technology and communication strengthened the role of the multinationals, 
a very thin line came to separate politics and economics as dominating factors 
in the quest for national security. 
A few examples will suffice to indicate the nature and scope of socio-
economic threats to national security throughout the entire region as the 
twenty first century approaches. 
In the remaining LDCs the most frequent complaints are that they are 
neglected, exploited or abused. In this view, they no longer receive 
substantial economic and security assistance because their support in the cold 
war is unnecessary. As their population explodes they sink deeper in poverty. 
They are exploited for their cheap labor. They are too poor to attract overseas 
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investments and too weak to command a fair price for their raw materials. 
Because their governments are usually in the hands of autocrats, any 
economic progress is likely to lead to more demands for political freedom and 
thus greater domestic instability. Whether because of the avarice of their own 
authorities or the greed of foreign entrepreneurs, their people stand 
helplessly by as their rain forests are cut down or their lands or offshore 
waters are used as dumps for toxic waste. Such combinations of political and 
economic woes as these help to account for the floods of refugees and illegal 
immigrants in other states. 
The NIEs in Asia feel that a large share of their security concerns is a 
consequence of economic injustice. They also feel too weak in comparison 
with the stronger nations of the west to attempt to use political means to 
attempt to redress the economic imbalance. Being in different stages of 
modernization, their rivalry is intense to attract the capital and know-how 
essential for their development programs. Economic conflicts between 
borrowers and lenders are unavoidable. The Asian borrower is usually an 
individual or interest group which must first obtain its government's 
backing. For that the borrower must pay dearly. In his joint venture with the 
foreign investor, he will pull every string he can to maximize his share of the 
profits. The investor, aware of the risks of operating in an alien 
environment, must insure that his contract will be honored and that his 
capital and profits can be repatriated. Too often he might feel tempted to play 
politics to get the partner he prefers, or to offer a bribe or two. In an 
environment where operational disagreements are the order of the day, 
economic arguments are bound to lead to frayed tempers and political 
reprisals. 
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The principal feature of the strategic environment in East Asia and the 
Pacific now is the shift in importance from containment to economics first. 
This shift began with the Nixon shocks in the early '70s when the commercial 
world practically abandoned the Bretton Woods system. Until then a 
reasonable balance in international trade and finance was maintained. No 
one complained of the high cost of security because of the reality of the threat 
from the Soviet Union, this changed with the advent of Gorbachev. 
With the eclipse of Soviet power, the sense of clear and present danger 
tended to disappear. The Americans, however, piled up huge budgetary 
deficits and negative balances in the international income account while 
carrying the heaviest burden of the common defense. Europeans prospered, 
Asian economies boomed, while the Americans suffered. The 
disproportionate costs in lives and money of the Gulf War made it 
abundantly manifest to all concerned that it was time to make a brand new 
assessment of the general security situation. 
In 1991 the distinguished scholars and statesmen of the Williamsburg 
Conference made this report on "The Need for a More Complex Conception 
of Security": 
All the societies in the region ... are in the vortex of 
a revolution arising from the incredible pace of 
socio-economic change. In light of this, security 
cannot be defined solely by reference to prosaic 
inter-state military relations. The Leninist states 
are trying to find a formula to allow for the 
flexibility needed for development with the 
discipline needed for stability. Similarly, the 
democratic states are experiencing the difficulty of 
governability in an increasingly pluralistic society. 
Furthermore, the pressure stemming from 
economic integration between nations with 
differing backgrounds, different development 
strategies and at different levels of development 
creates enormous tension. In this situation, 
security must be seen as starting at home. Even in 
the case of the United States, for those living in 
urban centers, security has more to do with 
whether it is safe to go out at night than with a 
foreign military threat. In addition, the threat 
perception for much of the American public is 
economic and relates not just to Japan but to the 
NIEs and the ASEAN four. These differing threat 
perceptions illustrate the need to conceptualize 
security in a new and complex manner. 
The Current Scene 
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In analyzing the current problems of national security in East Asia and 
the Pacific, these basic assumptions must be kept in mind. Fundamentally, 
the problems of war, peace and prosperity are global. They cannot be 
addressed in any single region without reference to causes and effects in the 
rest of the world. 
East Asia and the Pacific may be considered as a distinct geographic 
region but it is a composite of different nationalities. People never think of 
themselves as East Asians, or Pacific Islanders, but rather as Japanese or 
Chinese, Koreans or Filipinos, or perhaps Thais or Indonesians. Because 
their loyalties are to their own kind, their friendships and their animosities 
are strong. The sense of nationalism, however blurred, is the strongest tie 
binding diverse social groups into a common political unit. The nation-state 
is still the core of the international system. 
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New forces, mainly economic, are asserting themselves. Bullet trains, 
hydrofoils and jet planes have annihilated old perceptions of time and 
distance. Telephones, fax machines and VCRs have revolutionized 
organizational structures and methods of doing business. The instantaneous 
communication of intelligence and information have produced new 
instruments of power challenging the grip that kings or presidents and their 
generals have long held on the processes of war and diplomacy. 
In this study as will be seen, conflicts of interest are analyzed by 
subregions beginning with Northeast Asia. Russia still insists that its interest 
in the Far East are vital. It resents any assumption that it is finished as a great 
power or that its territorial integrity is open to question. It is not willing to 
abandon the Kuriles in spite of its desperate need for such economic 
assistance as Japan could provide. The Russian people may be down and out 
but their national pride is undiminished. 
To Japan, the national interest in Northeast Asia is paramount. The 
old cliche is still true that Korea is like a dagger pointing at the heart of Japan. 
The Sea of Japan and the East China Sea are no longer "protective moats to 
the blessed isles" of Japan. The last indignity suffered by Japan as a result of 
World War II is the Russian occupation of the Northern Islands and there is 
not likely to be any lasting peace in Northeast Asia until that problem is 
solved. Japan has substantial power to defend itself (undoubtedly nuclear 
capability) but it is uneasy in spirit as long as the Russian fleet and missiles 
are so close to home. Japan is vulnerable to destruction, and perhaps to 
invasion. It is more important for Japan to secure to the maximum extent 
possible its position in Northeast Asia than to obtain recognition of what it 
perceives as its rightful place in the world at large. 
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China's interests in Northeast Asia are equally vital. It will not stand 
idly by in the face of any threat to its homeland which stretches through 
Manchuria to the borders of Siberia and Korea. The exact frontiers have 
never been marked, but are topics of peaceful negotiation. China's diplomatic 
objectives in Northeast Asia are limited to stability and peace, which China 
sees as essential to its national development. China has welcomed such 
multilateral economic projects as the development of the Tumen River 
Basin. 
The decisive new element in the future of security in Northeast Asia is 
the role to be played by the Koreans themselves. Their country is no longer 
the subject of a great power to be moved about as a pawn on a chessboard. 
They are one nation but two systems. The problem of unification is elusive 
and the danger of nuclear proliferation in the north has put the western 
world on edge. All parties have an overall interest in the peaceful solution of 
these issues on the Korean peninsula. 
The North Korean situation offers an unusual opportunity for regional 
peace making. Russia and China have taken the first steps in cross 
recognition by restoring normal relations with South Korea. The Framework 
Agreement between the United States and North Korea is a significant step 
toward normalization in relations between the United States and its ally 
Japan with North Korea. The Framework Agreement spells out a reasonable 
program for settling the complicated issue of nuclear non-proliferation 
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within the framework of the broader political and economic issues that 
divide North and South. It presents and opportunity for all parties to look 
beyond the threats and potential crises to the possibility of using the Korean 
situation as a catalyst for a regional arrangement addressing such conflicts of 
interest as the Russo-Japan impasse over the Kuriles and the security 
misunderstandings between the United States and China. 
Since the end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, the quest for security 
has undergone changes comparable to those in the Northeast. As long as the 
fighting continued in Vietnam, the other nation-states of Southeast Asia 
found common cause with the United States against the threat of 
communism. As time passed, they succeeded in putting down their own 
insurgencies and in developing their economies with programs of their own 
choice. For their mutual protection, they were encouraged to organize 
ASEAN if only to get to know each other better. They found in their regional 
organization an effective means of supplementing their own national 
strength and enhancing their prestige. Suspicious of China and Japan, and 
not too comfortable with their neighbors Australia and India,they promoted 
the idea of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPF AN) for their 
collective security but that turned out to be far less dependable than the 
benign presence of the American fleet. 
The member states of ASEAN (Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei) have not only achieved spectacular success 
but have become self reliant and assertive in the solution of their security 
problems. As heirs of imperial rivalry, they are still suspicious and 
distrustful of one another. Everyone of them is embroiled in a boundary 
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dispute with its neighbors. Within the organization the clash of national 
interests complicates the process of consensus-building. Indonesia and 
Thailand differ substantially in their perceptions of the potential threat from 
China; the Philippines ans Indonesia react differently to Japan; while 
Malaysia and Indonesia start from different premises from Thailand and the 
Philippines in their assessments of the United States. 
The economic rivalries within ASEAN are intense. The standards of 
living of member states are growing but for the most part are still on the low 
side. Their economies are similar, and they are all driven by export-
promotion. Their competition for foreign investments keeps their interest 
rates high and their labor costs low. They have not been able to reach 
agreement on genuine free trade or a regional common market. In spite of 
interdependence and the prevalence of multi-nationals, their competitive 
struggles are as bitter as ever. 
With regard to the military aspects of security, the armed forces of 
Southeast Asian states are no longer limited to police work but are 
professionalized to protect their respective countries against aggression from 
the outside. They are subjected to civil control but in Thailand and Indonesia 
they have assumed a high degree of political and economic power. Southeast 
Asian states have 10 million men under arms. They spend more than $100 
billion annually with increases of 25% per year. Their greatest source of 
supply has been the United States to date where they have obtained the best 
concessional terms. They are now in the market for the best conventional 
arms, ships, airplanes and missiles at the cheapest price, which now may 
mean purchasing from China, Russia, France or Eastern Europe. Fortunately, 
they show more inclination to adopt confidence and security building 
measures and to conduct military exercises than to resort to threat or use of 
force. 
Z3 
ASEAN itself has been exemplary in exploring multilateral paths to 
peace and understanding. It has reached out to include the rest of Southeast 
Asia in its fold. Vietnam is well on its way to membership; Laos as usual is 
laggard; Kampuchea is in the throes of civil chaos; and Burma has not made 
up its mind if it wants to join the modern world. The welcome mat is out for 
all to join ASEAN in due course. 
For multilateral help in solving their economic problems, the 
members of ASEAN have turned to APEC and to GAIT, and they are toying 
with Prime Minister Mahatir's proposal for an exclusive East Asia Economic 
Caucus. They have adopted joint procedures for maritime safety and for 
combatting smuggling, piracy and the drug traffic. 
The most interesting steps in the direction of multilateralism has been 
taken by ASEAN's Post Minister's Conference (PMC} .Originally the Foreign 
Ministers met annually to discuss their mutual problems. Then they 
discovered that it made sense to invite as dialogue partners (the United 
States, Australia and Japan) because of their economic interests in the region. 
Then the PMC decided to include China and Russia as guests. Eventually the 
states of Indochina were invited as observers and all categories attended the 
first of what was conceived to be an annual meeting of an Asia Regional 
Forum (ARF}. The first meeting of the ARF was limited to one session of 
three hours, during which time all the representatives of eighteen nations 
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were expected to offer their ideas. At the risk of making ARF so general and 
so all-inclusive as to be meaningless, invitations were also extended to NGOs 
(Non Governmental Organizations), academics, private interests and 
distinguished persons. These are ambitious multilateral steps but they are 
clearly in line with Churchill's observation, "Jaw, jaw is better than war, 
war.". 
Because of its immensity, China must be treated as a separate sub-
region of East Asia. Itsfuture is the key to peace from Siberia to Singapore. 
With its milennia of experience, the quality of its culture and civilization 
must be recognized. It has evolved from a unique society to one of the major 
nation-states of the contemporary world. The entire communist period in 
China is only a degree on the long them1ometer of Chinese history. 
There is no question about China's growth in economic and military 
power. The World Bank suggests its GNP may rival that of the United States 
by 2020. Its army is the largest in the world. Its navy does not yet have blue 
water capability but it can protect China's coastline. It has long range missiles 
and nuclear capability. A repetition of the unequal treaties or the Japanese 
invasion is entirely out of the question. China has come to terms with its 
past, asking nothing more except peace and stability so that it can continue on 
the path of its own modernization. 
China's major problems are domestic. Above all is the matter of its 
territorial integrity. It is pleased with the recovery of Hong Kong, but the 
future of Taiwan is tantalizing. China is not covetous of neighboring lands 
which are home for many overseas Chinese. There is no reason to believe 
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that China is willing to resort to force to satisfy its claims to its lost territories 
along the Amur, in Central Asia or in the South China Sea. 
China's greatest challenge is to preserve its own society. How can 
China provide jobs to govern and feed 1.2 billion people? How can Chinese 
authorities balance the needs of society with individual rights in 
administering a country equal in size and with more than twice the 
population of all Europe? How can they balance old traditions with the 
looming freedoms of the 21st Century, especially when those freedoms are 
equated with "spiritual pollution". The Chinese do not believe that westem-
style democracy and the free market are their wave of the future. Looking 
beyond "socialism with Chinese characteristics", they want to design and 
fulfill their own destiny. All they ask is that there shall not be war along the 
way. 
Of the three subregions of East Asia, China is perhaps the least 
understood by the United States. Today's China is a far cry from the China of 
a hundred years ago. The United States means no more no less to China 
today than China means to the United States. The United States is the 
"Middle Kingdom" of the Americas; China is the "Middle Kingdom" of the 
Asians. As equal sovereigns they will share in the shaping of tomorrow's 
world. 
The Special Role of the United States. 
In shaping the strategic environment in East Asia and the Pacific in 
tomorrow's world, the United States cannot avoid the responsibilities that 
flow from its predominant power position. Its military might, amply 
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demonstrated in the Gulf War, is supreme. Economically, it is still No. 1. The 
purchasing power of the American consumer has been the engine for driving 
the prosperity of the Asian nations. The American mastery of high 
technology together with its leadership along the information highway is 
likely to preserve its position as the world's only genuine superpower for the 
foreseeable future. 
It is within this global framework that the national interests and 
strategies pertaining to Asia must be defined and continuously reappraised. 
For a democracy such as the United States this is not easy. Political parties 
thrive on contentious ideas and rival interest groups battle for control of 
foreign policy. Detroit wants protection against foreign cars, California 
drivers want cheap and dependable cars no matter where they come from. 
The National Manufacturers Association likes NAFTA, the AFL-CIO opposes 
it. It makes sense to say that the United States must protect and promote 
American interests, but the problem is "whose interests". What helps some 
Americans, hurts some others. 
While directing some attention to problems in Asia, the United States 
cannot lose sight of its problems at home and in such other regions as Latin 
America, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Unemployment, AIDS, drug 
control and crime on the streets must take precedence over down sizing the 
armed forces or erasing the trade deficit. News headlines or daily broadcasts 
are much more likely to feature Haiti, Boris Yeltsin, Bosnia or Somalia than 
the issues that present the United States with the most difficult challenges 
and the greatest opportunities for stability and peace in Asia. 
As the United States looks ahead, it must address the basic question, 
"What are the best strategies to be followed in protecting American 
interests?". Each sub region has its own quota of special problems. For 
example, in Northeast Asia: 
How far should Yeltsin be encouraged and supported? 
What if Yakutia or Sakhalin should declare independence? 
Are any modifications in order in treaty relations 
with Japan? What about trade relations? 
Can the U.S. more effectively promote unification of Korea? 
Should troops in Northeast Asia be further downsized? 
Should further multilateral diplomatic processes be 
encouraged? 
In Southeast Asia: 
What "places not bases" agreements should be sought 
to compensate for loss of Clark Field and Subic Bay? 
What further support for ASEAN is merited? 
What strategies asre in order in dealing with Vietnam, 
Laos and Kampuchea? Also with Burma? 
Are further adjustments in order for ANZUS relations? 
In China: 
Is the U.S. sufficiently tough in trade negotiations? 
Are U.S. interests protected in the course of Mainland-
Taiwan negotiations? 
Should there be more or less emphasis on democracy and 
human rights in China relations? 
How can U.S. strategies be improved in dealing with non-
proliferation and other security issues? 
Should China be admitted to GATT or to the WTO? 
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As has been learned from the past, the answers to such questions will 
please some, antagonize others. The United States cannot worry about 
criticism, but simply follow Shakespeare's admonition, "to thine own self be 
true". The casualties of two wars-Korea and Vietnam-were a heavy price to 
pay for the shortcomings of the past. The mission now of the United States is 
to lead in reduction of tensions, resolution of conflicts and avoidance of war. 
Lasting security does not lie in an upward spiral of arms development, fueled 
by mutual suspicion, but in a commitment to joint survival. If each nation 
takes into account the security anxieties of others, seeks to implement 
confidence- building measures and maximize the benefits of cooperation, 
East Asia can indeed be transformed from the cockpit of conflict that it was in 
Cold War to a model region for peace and prosperity in the 21st Century. 
